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WHAT CONSTITUTES EMANCIPATION OF A CHID
The purpose of this discussion is, as the title suggests, to deter-
mine the general law in regard to the doctrine of emancipation. This
paper will not attempt to treat this broad subject in detail, but will
attempt to set out the elements necessary to constitute emancipation
as a matter of law, and to examine representative factual situations
from which emancipation may or may not be implied.
DEVINITION
"Emancipation," in its most literal sense, means "releasing," or
"setting free."1 Used in a legal sense, "emancipation" means the re-
linquishment by a parent of control and authority over his child, con-
ferring on the child the right to his earnings and extinguishing the
parent's legal duty to maintain and support the child.2 Emancipation
of children by their parents, as known and applied today, was entirely
unknown to the common law.8 Under the Roman law, a child was
formally enfranchised by his father in an imaginary sale, but Justinian
substituted for this the more simple proceeding of manumission by a
magistrate.4 In England a child remained, under almost all circum-
stances, unemancipated, and it was held by Lord Kenyon that there
can be emancipation of a child only if he marries and so becomes him-
self the head of a family or contracts some other relation so as to
wholly and permanently exclude the parental control. 5 In the United
States, however, the doctrine of emancipation has been applied with
greater liberality.
How EMANCIPATION MAY Bz E1 crZCnD
Emancipation may be effected by the consent of the parent, either
written or oral, express or implied, or by operation of law, but can
never be accomplished by an act of the child alone.6 For purposes
of this discussion, the two methods of effecting an emancipation
(i. e., by consent of the parent and by operation of law) will be con-
sidered separately.
1. By consent of the parent.
The consent of the parent to an emancipation of a minor child may
1. Porter v. Powell, 79 Iowa 151, 44 N.W. 295 (1890).
2. Rounds Bros. v. McDaniel, 133 Ky. 669, 118 S.W. 956 (1909), 134 Am. St.
Rep. 482, 19 Ann. Cas. 326.
3. 39 Am. Jur., Parent and Child, § 64 (1942).
4. SHIOULER, DOMESTIc RELATIONS, § 267 (5th Ed. 1895).
5. Ibid; Rex v. Roach, 6 T.R. 247 (1795); Rex v. Wilmington, 5 B.&ALD.
525 (1822).
6. Parker v. Parker, S.C. ,94 S.E. 2d 13 (1956).
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be express, as by voluntary agreement of the parent and child, or
it may be implied from such acts as import consent, and it may be
absolute, complete, or partial.7 Where there is a written agreement
to that effect, little difficulty is encountered in proving the emancipa-
tion. But most cases in which an express emancipation is alleged
involve oral agreements. It has been held to be an express eman-
cipation where the parent freely and voluntarily agreed with his
child, who was able to take care of and provide for himself, that he
might leave home, earn his own living, and do as he pleased with
his time and earnings.8 In a recent case it was held that a parent's
making of an oral contract with his son to the effect that if the son
would remain on the farm and render service to the parents the farm
would be devised to him constituted sufficient evidence of the emanci-
pation of the son, as respects recovery for services rendered during
the son's minority.9
A complete emancipation is generally defined as an entire surrender
of all the rights to the care, custody, and earnings of the child, as well
as a renunciation of parental duties.10 In determining whether there
has been a partial or complete emancipation, the test to be. applied is
that of the preservation or destruction of the parental and filial re-
lations.1 1 A severance of the filial relationship occurs when the child
is placed in a new relationship inconsistent with his former relation
as a part of his parent's family,12 or, as was stated by a New York
court, when "the child is thrown upon his own resources and is free
to act upon his own responsibility and in accordance with his own
desires." 13  Thus, a nineteen year old son, who formerly worked
away from home and gave his wages to his mother, who in return
gave him room, clothing and spending money, and who later worked
in his parents' store on the same basis, was held not emancipated.
14
But it is not necessary that the child leave home or work away from
home in order to sever the filial tie. Where a son lived at his father's
home, paid room and board, bought his own clothes, and made no
accounting to his father of his funds, it was held that a finding of
emancipation was fully sustained by the evidence. 15
7. Wallace v. Cox, 136 Tenn. 69, 188 S.W. 611 (1916).
8. Brosius v. Barker, 154 Mo. App. 657, 136 S.W. 18 (1911).
9. Costello v. Costello, 134 Conn. 536, 59 A. 2d 520 (1948).
10. Brosius v. Barker, note 8, supra.
11. Cafaro v. Cafaro, 118 N.J.L. 123, 191 A. 472 (1937).
12. Town of Plainville v. Town of Milford, 119 Conn. 380, 177 A. 138 (1935).
13. Cohen v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 269 N.Y.S. 667, 150 Misc. 450 (1934).
14. Cafaro v. Cafaro, note 11, supra.
15. Groh v. W. 0. Kahn, Inc., 223 Wisc. 662, 271 N.W. 374 (1937) ; (accord,
Dierker v. Hess, 54 Mo. 246 (1873), where it was said that it was not neces-
sary, in order to constitute emancipation, that the son cease to be a member of
[Vol. 9
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A recent California case 16 held that where a twenty year old
daughter lived at home, but did not occupy a subordinate position
in the home, was gainfully employed and received her own earnings,
the evidence was sufficient to constitute an emancipation. Nor does
the fact, of itself, that a child lives and works away from home imply
emancipation. Where a son, with his mother's consent, left home
to make his own way, but later wrote afectionate and filial letters
to his mother, it was held that there was no emancipation.
17
Although there may be no express consent of the parent, such con-
sent may be implied from the acts and conduct of the parent, where
his acts or conduct are inconsistent with his claim to the further
obedience or services of the child.1 8
It should be stated here that, in some cases, emancipation by the
consent of the parent, either express or implied, may be revoked by
the parent.19 A gratuitous consent on the part of the parent may
be revoked or renounced by the parent within a "reasonable" time;
that is, before it has been acted upon by the child, or before some
third party, such as an employer of the child, has obtained some in-
terest in the emancipation.
2 0
The child's taking advantage of his freedom and securing a posi-
tion at good wages is such action upon the emancipation as will make
it irrevocable by the parent.2 1 But if the relinquishment of his
rights by the parent is supported by a valuable consideration, or
if the parent does not revoke within a reasonable time, the emanci-
pation is absolute and cannot be revoked.22 What is a "reasonable"
time will depend on the circumstances of a given case. It was held
his father's household or that the emancipation be accompanied by some token
or ceremonial, but that the fact that the father had relinquished his claim to the
son's earnings might be established either by direct evidence or be implied from
circumstances).
16. Martinez v. Southern Pacific Co., 45 Cal. 2d 244, 288 P. 2d 868 (1955).
17. Spurgeon v. Mission State Bank, 55 F. Supp. 305 (W.D. Mo. 1943).
18. See Constance v. Gosnell, 62 F. Supp. 253 (W.D. S.C. 1945), where the
court held that implied emancipation may arise from conduct of the father in-
consistent with his claim to the further obedience or services of his child. See
also Patek v. Plankinton Packing Co., 179 Wisc. 442, 190 N.W. 921 (1922),
where it was said that "implied emancipation may be inferred from such circum-
stances and conduct on the part of the parent as reasonably leads to the conclu-
sion that he expects the child to provide for himself without accounting to the
parent for his earnings."
19. Rounds Bros. v. McDaniel, 133 Ky. 669, 118 S.W. 956 (1909).
20. Professor Madden, in MADDEN, PERSONS AND DoMEsTic RiEATIONS (Ist
Ed. 1931) says, at p. 414: "If the emancipation is without consideration, how-
ever, it may be revoked at any time before it is acted upon, and from the time
of the revocation the parent is restored to his original rights. It is a mere
gift or license, and, like any other gift or license, it may be revoked at any time
before it is accepted, and acceptance is acting upon it."
21. Rounds Bros. v. McDaniel, 133 Ky. 669, 118 S.W. 956 (1909).
22. Ibid; Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905 (1930).
1957]
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in Rounds Bros. v. McDaniel,23 where a minor son left home with
the knowledge of his father, secured employment, and for two years
received and spent his own earnings without accounting to his father,
the emancipation was absolute and could not be revoked by the
father as he did not act within a reasonable time.
A child may be emancipated for certain purposes but not for
others. In such a case there is a partial emancipation. The most
common instance of partial emancipation is that of a gift to the child
of his earnings, or the parents' allowing a child to secure employment
and keep his earnings. Thus it has been held that the gift of his
earnings to the child does not in itself operate as a complete sever-
ance of all the mutual rights and duties arising out of the relationship
of parent and child, and the right of the child to his earnings does
not depend on the question whether he has been fully emancipated.
2 4
Although it is well settled that what constitutes an emancipation
is a question of law, the question of whether an emancipation has
occurred in a particular case is one of fact for the jury.25 The im-
portant consideration then, is what circumstances and conduct in a
particular case will justify the implication of an emancipation. It
has been held in numerous cases that where the child hires himself
out to an employer, either with the express consent of his parent or
without objection from the parent, collects and retains his earnings,
a jury finding of emancipation is justified by the evidence. (But,
as has been seen above, such facts may constitute only a partial
emancipation, depending on whether there has been a severance of
the filial relation.) But a mere offer of a gift of his earnings to the
child, not acted upon by the child, does not constitute an emancipa-
tion.2 ( However, a recent Pennsylvania case27 held where a 16 year
old girl had been working for about four years prior to her acciden-
tal death, had earned and spent her own money, and her paernts had
exercised no authority or control over her behavior other than in an
advisory capacity, that these facts constituted sufficient evidence
of complete emancipation, so that her administrator instead of her
father could prosecute an action to recover damages for her wrong-
ful death. It has been held that where the parent brings an action
for and on behalf of his child, as next friend of the child, and not in
23. Rounds Bros. v. McDaniel, 133 Ky. 669, 118 S.W. 956 (1909).
24. Dunks v. Grey, 3 F. 862 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1880). See also P. J. Hunnicutt
& Co. v. Thompson, 159 N.C. 29, 74 S.E. 628 (1912) ; Detwiler v. Detwiler,
162 Pa. Super. 383, 57 A. 2d 426 (1948). In the latter case it was held that an
eighteen year old boy, who quit school at the age of seventeen, earned and spent
his own money, but continued to live at home, was not emancipated.
25. Parker v. Parker, S.C. ,94 S.E. 2d 13 (1956) ; 67 C.J.S., Parent
and Child, § 90 (1950).
26, Smith v. Gilbert, 80 Ark. 525, 98 S.W. 115 (1906).
27. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Patesel, 118 Ind. App. 233, 76 N.E. 2d 595 (1948).
[Vol. 9
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his own right as a parent entitled to the earnings and services of the
child, this does not, in the absence of other circumstances, amount
to an implied emancipation.28 But where a father brought an action
on behalf of his minor son and as his next friend, and asserted in
his suit that the son had the right to receive such damages, it was
held that this amounted to an allegation of the emancipation of the
son.29 Also, where the father had brought suit as next friend of his
child to recover damages for personal injuries received in the course
of the child's employment, and subsequently brought suit in his own
right for loss of services of the child in connection with the same in-
jury, it was held that he could not recover because his prosecution
as next friend of the child in the first action amounted to a relin-
quishment of such loss of son's services. 0
It has been seen that the fact that a child leaves and lives away
from home does not of itself constitute an emancipation. But where
the child has voluntarily abandoned the parental roof, turned his
back to its protection and influence, it has been held that the parent
is under no obligation to support him and a complete emancipation
may be implied.3 1  And where the child leaves home, with the con-
sent of the parent, to make his own way in the world, it has been
frequently held that this is an implied complete emancipation.
32 It
28. Farrar v. Wheeler, 145 F. 482 (1st Cir. 1906) ; Pawnee Farmers Elevator
Co. v. Powell, 76 Colo. 1, 227 P. 836 (1942). But see Abeles v. Bransfield,
19 Kan. 16 (1877) where it was held that a mother's act in commencing an ac-
tion in her son's name as his next friend, setting forth in the petition the loss
of time and expenses incurred as a part of her son's damages resulting from
an injury sustained by him, and in asking judgment in favor of her son for
such damages, must be conclusively presumed to amount to a relinquishment in
his favor of all her rights to recover compensation for such loss of time and
such expenses, so that recovery might be had in the name of the son.
29. Revel v. Pruitt, 42 Okla. 696, 142 P. 1019 (1914). See also Augler v.
Badgely, 29 Ill. App. 336 (1888).
30. Baker v. Flint & P. M. R. Co., 91 Mich. 298, 51 N.W. 897 (1892);
Chicago School Co. v. Weiss, 203 Ill. 536, 69 N.E. 54 (1903); National City
Development Co. v. McFerran, 55 A. 2d 342 (Wash. D.C. 1947).
31. Brosius v. Barker, note 8, supra. But see Porter v. Powell, 79 Iowa 151,
44 N.W. 295 (1890). There a daughter, at the age of fourteen, went to reside
away from her father's house, at a place some 30 miles distant, and for three
years she contracted for, earned, and controlled her own wages, clothed her-
self, and her father neither promised or gave her any money or means of sup-
port. Nevertheless, it was held that the father was liable for medical services
rendered the child, at the child's request, and without the knowledge or consent
of the father. The court held this an emancipation for the purpose of reliev-
ing the daughter of her duty of service to her parent, but not emancipation
for the purpose of relieving the father of his duty to furnish necessary medical
attention in the event of the sickness of the daughter.
32. But if the child leaves home under the erroneous assumption that the
father has emancipated him, his rights to his earnings and services are not
absolute as in the case of an express emancipation, and the father may, by tak-
ing timely action, resume parental authority and reclaim the services of the child.
Rounds Bros. v. McDaniel, 133 Ky. 669, 118 S.W. 956 (1909).
1957]
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has also been held that the appointment of a guardian for a child does
not of itself amount to an emancipation,3 3 but a child may be emanci-
pated by being given away to someone else.34 However, such a gift
must be complete, and must terminate the filial relation.35 Where
the parents of a minor child contracted with another person that the
child would live with such other person until he reached 21 years
of age, it was held that this did not constitute an emancipation be-
fore the child became 21.30 And where a minor child was taken
from its parents and detained in an insane asylum without the father's
consent, it was held that this did not constitute an emancipation.
3 7
2. By operation of law.
Emancipation of a child may be effected by operation of law where
the parent abandons or fails to support the child, where the child
marries, either with or without the consent of his parent, and where
the child attains his majority. An emancipation by operation of law
is also effected where the child enlists or is drafted into military
service, and such emancipation is effective for so long, at least, as
the military service continues.
(a) Abandonment or failure to support
The law relating to abandonment or failure to support a child is
well summarized in the leading case of Roumds Bros. v. McDaniel3 8
where the court says: "A parent, although entitled to the services
and earnings of his child, may relinquish or surrender this right by
failing to provide for his child a home if he is able to do so, or by
such ill treatment, neglect, or cruel conduct as forces the child to
abandon his home, or by becoming so degraded or dissolute a charac-
ter that his child cannot in morals or decency live with him."
(b) Marriage of the child
It is well settled that the marriage of a child with the consent of the
parent constitutes an emancipation of the child. Although there
is some conflict on the question whether marriage of a child still
under the age of consent, without the permission of the parent, con-
33. Lessard v. Great Falls Woolen Co., 83 N.H. 576, 145 A. 782 (1929).
34. Town of Tunbridge v. Town of Eden, 39 Vt. 17 (1866).
(In South Carolina, by statute, a parent may, under certain conditions, deed
away the custody of his child for the remainder of its minority, and such dis-
position of the child is valid against all persons claiming custody of the child as
guardian or otherwise. CODr, op LAws OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 §§ 31-52 -
31-55.)
35. Brumfield v. Brumfield, 194 Va. 577, 74 S.E. 2d 170 (1953).
36. Tamworth v. New-Market, 3 N.H. 472 (1826).
37. Guthrie County v. Conrad, 133 Iowa 171, 110 N.W. 454 (1907).
38. Rounds Bros. v. McDaniel, 133 Ky. 669, 118 S.W. 956 (1909).
[Vol. 9
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stitutes an emancipation,3 9 it seems to be the majority and better
rule that an emancipation is thereby effected.4°  A recent Texas
case41 held that a seventeen year old married girl was qualified to
be appointed guardian of a person adjudged to be of unsound mind,
and that a statute providing that an unemancipated minor was not
qualified to be appointed guardian did not apply to her. Those cases
holding that marriage does effect an emancipation appear to adhere
to the theory that a new relation is created by a marriage, which is
inconsistent with the subjection of the child to the control and care
of his parents. A child is, by virtue of his marriage, subjected to
new responsibilities, recognized by law, and has a primary respon-
sibility to the new family created by the marriage.
(c) Attaining majority
The general rule is that a child is emancipated upon attaining his
majority (which is 21 years at common law, although by statute, in
some jurisdictions, a female reaches her majority at 18), except
where the child has an infirmity of mind or body rendering him in-
capable of taking care of himself and requiring that he remain with
his parent. But it has been held that where the child continues to
live with the parent after attaining his majority, and the latter con-
tinues to provide him with support and care, no emancipation is
effected.42
(d) Military service
The majority rule regarding minor's entry into military service is
well stated in the recent case of Green v. Green4' where it was said,
39. Guillebert v. Grenier, 107 La. 614, 32 So. 238 (1902). In this case the
court said: "To sustain the defense of emancipation by marriage not preceded
by consent would hold out encouragement to minors indifferent to parental in-
fluence and control to go counter to their proper authority. It would offer
inducements to youths to enter into improvident and ill-advised marriages which
mature years would cause them to regret or deplore." Accord, Easterly v.
Cook, 140 Cal. App. 115, 35 P. 2d 164 (1934) ; Irby v. State, 57 Ga. App. 717,
196 S.E. 101 (1938) ; White v. Henry, 24 Me. 531 (1845); People v. Todd, 61
Mich. 234, 28 N.W. 79 (1886) ; Austin v. Austin, 167 Mich. 164, 132 N.W. 495
(1911). In the last named case the court expressed the opinion that the lawful
marriage of minors emancipates both, but felt bound by the decision in People
v. Todd, supra, this note, which was construed as holding that the marriage of
a minor does not emancipate him.
40. See, generally Annot., 165 A.L.R. 745, 746, and cases there cited. See
also Ex parte Olcott, 141 N.J. Equity 8, 55 A. 2d 820 (1947) where it was
held that a sixteen year old female was emancipated by marriage.
41. Kinser v. Hudgins, 275 S.W. 2d 847 (Texas, 1955).
42. -Brown v. Ramsay, 29 N.J. 117 (1860). See also Union Pacific v. Jones,
21 Colo. 340, 40 P. 891 (1895) ; Overseers of Poor of Alexander Twp. v. Over-
seers of Poor of Bethlehem Twp., 16 N.J. 119, 31 Am. D. 229 (1837).
43. 234 S.W. 2d 350 (Mo. 1950). See also Swenson v. Swenson, 241 Mo.
App. 21,227 S.W. 2d 103 (1950).
19571
7
Marchbanks: What Constitutes Emancipation of a Child
Published by Scholar Commons, 1957
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTERLY
that where a minor became a member of the military establishment
of the country, "he was brought within the exclusive control of the
government and was emancipated so long as his service continued,
and the emancipation was effected by implication of law no less than
if it had been brought about by the voluntary act of the parent..
The recent California case of Argonaut Insurance Exchange v. Kates4 4
after a review of the cases on this question, recognized that the
majority view was as stated above, but adopted the minority view
that "the induction of the minor son into the army did not constitute
such an emancipation as to relieve the father of his obligation to com-
ply with a court order for support . . . ." Under the majority
view, there appears to be no distinction whether the minor enlists
or is drafted. If his military service is terminated while he is still a
minor, he will again become subservient to the authority of his
parents,4 5 but if he attains his majority while still in military service,
the emancipation becomes absolute under the same conditions noted
in subsection (c).
CONCLUSION
While the material on this subject presents an imposing array
of cases, in the final analysis there appears to be no serious conflict
in the authorities as to the law of emancipation. As has already been
stated,46 what constitutes emancipation is a matter of law, but the
question of whether an emancipation has occurred in a particular
case is a question of fact for the jury. There is a presumption that
a child attaining his majority is emancipated, but no such presump-
tion exists when the child is in his minority, and the burden rests on




44. 137 Cal. App. 2d 158, 289 P. 2d 801 (1955). See also the two New York
cases of Harwood v. Harwood, 49 N.Y.S. 2d 727 (1944), and Wack v. Wack,
74 N.Y.S. 2d 435 (1947). Both of these cases involved a written separation
agreement, and held that the induction into military service of a minor did not
operate as a temporary emancipation during the minor's term of service so
as to suspend the obligation of the father to make payments under the separa-
tion agreement.
45. Dean v. Oregon, R. & Nov. Co.. 44 Wash. 564, 87 P. 824 (1906). See
also Iriquois Iron Co. v. Industrial Commission, 294 Ill. 106, 128 N.E. 289
(1920) ; Baker v. Baker, 41 Vt. 55 (1868) ; Annot. 12 A.L.R. 924.
46. 67 C.J.S., Parent and Child, § 90 (1950).
47. Parker v. Parker, S.C. , 94 S.E. 2d 13 (1956).
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